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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 




SUSAN J!. CAMPBELL, 
Respond.~·nt. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 




This case is one in which plaintiff seeks to ·recover 
under the provisions of the Mechanic's Lien Statute for 
labor and materials sold to David J. Campbell and in-. 
stalled in the building owned by his wife Suzan M. Camp-_. 
bell, the defendant herein. That the labor and materials 
were used in altering, repairing and re-modeling the 
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2 
property at 729-731 North 2nd West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah which was owned by the defendant Suza:p. ~f. Camp-
bell. The plaintiff in its complaint seeks to recover the 
sum of $522.33 with interest at the rate of 6% per an-
num from April 24, 1946 and the sum of $25.00 attorney 
· fees together with costs and prayed that said sums be 
adjudged a lien upon the premises and land of the de-
fendant and that the same be foreclosed and that it have 
execution for any deficiency. 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on and between 
. the 14th day of February, 1946 and the 24th day of 
April, 1946 at the special instance and request of David 
J. Campbell, the husband of the defendant, acting by 
the defendant's authority as her agent and upon defen-
dant's promise, given by her agent, David J. Campbell 
to pay the reasonable value thereof. To this complaint 
a general denial was filed by the defendant and trial was 
had on the issues. On the trial of the issues the court 
filed its Findings of Fact in which the court found. 
1. ·That the said David J. Campbell "\vas not the 
duly authorized agent of the said -defendant and that 
the said plaintiff did not sell the said electrieal supplies 
and furnish the said labor and materials to David Camp-
bell as the duly authorized agent of the defendant Suzan 
M. Campbell but sold said electrical supplies and fur-
nished said labor to David J. Campbell personally and 
relied solely upon the personal credit of Mr. David J. 
Camp hell. 
STATEMENT OF POINT IN"\TOL 'TFJD 
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The only qn~stion for deter1ninn tion by this court 
is 'Yhether there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
sustain the findings of the trial court that David J. 
Ca1npbell 'Yas not acting as the duly authorized agent 
of the defendant Susan ~I. Ca1npbell and that the said 
plaintiff did not sell the said electrical n1aterial and fur-
nish the labor to DaYid J. Campbell as the duly auth-
orized agent of the defendant. 
~\RGU~iENT 
.. A.t the outset I agree 'vith counsel for the respon-
dent that the mechanic's Lien Statute of this state, Title 
52 U.C .. A .. 1943 contemplates that the lien may attach 
to an o'Yners interest in property for labor performed 
or materials furnished to the owner or his duly auth-
orized agent, but the respondent insists that under the 
facts as they appear in this record_·no such ·agency has 
heen established by a preponderance of th~ evidence, 
as contemplated by the mechanic's Lien statute. 
Counsel in his brief on page 9 argues that this being 
an equity action to foreclose a mechanic's Lien this court 
:;;hould review the facts and direct findings to be made 
in accordance 'vith the facts as interpreted by this court 
and counsel cites Bancroft's Code Practice and Renle-
dies \: ol. ;) section 3625, pages 4839 and 4840. The deci-
:;;ions of this court are so numerous on this question 
that it is not necessary to cite further authority. This 
court has fixed certain limitations upon the ~eope of 
rrYif\\' hy thi~ court in an equity case. 
'· 'rh e seone of revi e \\' on appeal in equi t~· 
en~·p~ i~ clearl~y settled in this jurisdiction. The 
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:-; u pre1ne Court i:-; authorized by the state consti-
tution to review the findings of the Trial Court 
in Equity cases, but the Findings of the Trial 
Courts upon confl,icting evidence will not be set 
aside unles;4 it ma~ifestly appears. that the c.ourt 
had nlisapplied proven fact~ or made findings 
rlearl~· against the weig_ht of the evidence.'' 
. (Huber v. Ne"\\rman, 106 Utah 363, 145 Pac. 2nd 
780). 
See also Stanley v. Stanley~ 94 Pac. -(2nd) 465; Bal-
dwin v. Nelson, 170 Pac. (2nd) 179. 
It is the contention of the respondent that there 
is sufficient evidence in this record to sustain the Find-
ings of the trial court. On the 24th day of November, 
1945 the defendant Susan Campbell acquired title to 
the property upon \Vhich the lien sought to be foreclosed 
\Vas placed. and that she immediately thereafter recorded 
her deed, placing it on the records of Salt Lake County 
and the sa1ne was of record at the time the plaintiff n1ade 
the contract \vith l\f r. Campbell and furnished the !nate-
rials sued for in plaintiff's con1plaint. l\Ir. David ,J. 
Ca1npbell \vas a contractor and builder and the Capitol 
Electric Co. had done \vork for ~fr. Campbell fron1 tin1e 
to tilne and had just completed t\vo jobs for l\1 r. Canlp-
bell, the Center Street job and the 4th north job. Both 
of these pieces· of property were in the na1ne of ::\1 r. 
David J. Campbell as shown by the transcript, page 23. 
On both of these two j·obs the materials were furnished 
and the labor performed solely on the personal credit 
of Mr. Campbell. Mr. Campbell personally paid for all 
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of the labor and 1naterials on both jobs \Vith the excep-
tion of a fe\v dollars as l\Ir. Latin1er testified. 
,\ ... hen ·these t"?·o jobs \vere about completed Mr.' 
Ca1npbell 'vent to the Capitol Electric Co., and ordered 
the 'vork done on the property at 729 North 2nd 
''rest, the property on 'vhich the appellant now seeks 
to forerlose its lien and ~Ir. Latimer testified that at 
the time the 'vork 'vas ordered there \vere no different 
arrange1nents made than when the work was done on the 
other t\vo jobs \\·here the title was in the name of Mr. 
Campbell and where the materials 'vere sold on his per-
sonal rredit and ~Ir. Campbell paid him (transcript page 
23.) 
~Irs. Can1pbell was· not present when the arrange-
ments were n1ade for the work on the property on \vhich 
plaintiff now seeks to foreclose its lien (transcript page 
26). The job was entered upon the books of the Capitol 
Electric Co. as a sale to David J. Campbell and he was 
charged \vith the labor and materials. 11 rs. Ca1nphell 
was never 'vith ilf r. Campbell at any time either at the 
place of business of the Capitol Electric Co. nor on the 
property at 729 North 2nd West (transcript page 10). 
She did not in any manner participate in the remodeling 
or give any instructions either to nf r. Latimer or to the 
worlnnen. When ·the \Vork \vas not paid· for, l\fr. Latimer 
did not make any demand upon :h!rs. Can1pbell for pay-
ment because as Mr. Latimer testified (transcript page 
25) he had been dealing \vith l\T r. Campbell and had ex-
tended the credit to l\Ir. Catnpbell. 
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On the 24th day of June, 1946 when ~fr. Latimer 
signed the affidavit for the lien upon the property at 
729 North 2nd West, Mr. Latimer knew that Mrs. Camp-
bell owned the property but made no demand upon her 
for payment because as he said he had been dealing 
with Mr. Campbell and extended the credit to him, and 
Mr. Latimer swore under oath that he had sold the Inate-
rials and performed the labor for Mr. David J. Camp-
bell and _made no mention of any agency between ~fr. 
and Mrs. Campbell at that time. 
Counsel for the appellant -has carefully on pag-es 4 
and 5 of his brief set forth all of the evidence in the 
record 'vhich is in any respect favorable to a finding. 
that the Capitol Electric Company sold the materials 
and performed the labor sued for by the plaintiff to 
David J. Campbell as· the duly authorized agent of the 
defendant. 
But this evidence falls far short of being sufficient 
for establishing an agency between Mr. and Mrs. Can1p-
bell, by a preponderance of the evidence. The conclusion 
most favorable to· the plaintiff that can be drawn from 
this evidence is that Mrs. Campbell owned the property 
and permitted her husband David J. Campbell to man-
age it for her, and that' she signed papers for the sale 
of the property.· 
This evidence ha.s never been held sufficien"t to es-
tablish an agency between a hushand and wife so as to 
create a lien upon her property. 
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4 
The rule generally follo\vPd in detern1ining \vhether 
the husband is acting as the agent of her husband so as 
to create a lien upon her propert~T i~ ~et. forth, in 36 
...-\.J., ~fechanic Liens, Sec. 101, page 78: 
j, 'The relationship of principal and agent he-
t,veen a husband and wife has been not inferable 
fron1 Yarious circumstances. Thus it has been 
declared that the husbands authority to act as 
the \vife 's agent is not to be ilnplied from the 
n1arital relation or the 1nere fact that he occupied 
or n1anaged and controlled his \vife 's property." 
The only evidence in this record favorable to a find-
ing that 1[r. Campbell was acting as the agent of ~fr~. 
Campbell is some evidence indicating that Mrs. Camp-
bell permitted ~Ir. Campbell to manage her property. 
See Hoffman v. ~IcFadden, 56 Ark. 217; 19 S.W. 753, 4 
A.L.R. 1039. Caldwell v. Overall, 99 Pa.c. (2nd) 496. 
In Cald,v·ell v. Overall the court said: 
dlt is settled that before a lien can be p:-;-
tablished against real estate the contraet must be 
Inade \vith the owner or his duly authorized agent 
and that the right to the lien depends upon such 
contract( Deka Development Co. v. Fox, 170 Okla. 
228, 39 Pac. (2nd) 143. While the husbands 
authority to act for his wife is not implied from 
the marriage relation nor front fhe n1ere fact tha,t 
he occupied and nJan~a.rJed the 1rife's property. Yet 
in many instances the agency of the husband is 
inferred from the circumstances. As \vhen the 
'vife i\:new that the lien claimant \vas \vorking on 
thp prop0rty and personally g-ave directions as 
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8 
to parts of the work. When she participated in 
conversations between the c-ontractors and the 
husband relative to the work while it was being 
done or when she furnished what money was 
paid.'' 
The evidence in this case is to the effect that Mrs. 
Campbell was never on the property and at no time had 
any c.onversations with the plaintiff or the workmen or 
participated in any conversations between the plaintiff 
or his w·orkmen and Mr. Campbell relative to the work 
'vhile it 'vas going on, and there is no evidence that l\{rs. 
Campbell furnished any money toward the improve-
ments. l\f r. Latimer te.stified that all of the money paid 
to him 'vas paid _by Mr. Campbell and there is no evi-
dence that any of the money was furnished by 1Irs. 
Campbell. 
While the question as to ~hether Mrs. Campbell 
was acting as the agent of Mrs. Campbell· is one of fact 
the courts have held that certain circumstances are suffi-
cient to constitute such an agency and others are not. 
36 A.J. l\{echanic Laws, Section 100, page 78 sets 
forth the circumstances that the courts have held suffi-
cient to create an agency between the husband and wife: 
''There are numerous circumstanc-es fron1 
which agency of the husband to contract for his 
wife n1ay he inferred or implied among these 
are the giving by the wife of personal directions 
to the claimant as to parts of the work, participa-
tion in conversations between her husband and 
the contractors relative to the work during thr 
time it was being done without raising objections 
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to her liability; the furnishing of n1oney to be 
paid on the building or ilnproven1ent the fact that 
her husband had no interest in the particular 
piece of property upon "~hich the iinproveinent 
"·as Inade: the deliverY of most of the material 
. directly to the "~ife a~d th.e joining of the 'vife 
",.ith her husband in the execution of a lease which 
provided for erection of the building.'' 
Not a single one of the foregoing circumstances as 
indicating an agency "~as established by the evidence in 
this record. :Jirs. Campbell gave no personal directions; 
she did not participate in any conversations between her 
husband and ~fr. Latimer or his workmen. She was not 
present "'"hile the \vork was being carried· on, and she 
gave no suggestion and gave no- orders. She paid no 
money and \Vas not present when the contract was made. 
In :Jf echanic 's Liens A.J., page 7 4 section 101 sets 
forth the various circumstances which the courts have 
held insufficient to establish a lien upon a 'vife 's prop-
erty: 
''The relationship of principal and agent be-
t\veen a husband and wife has been :held not in-
ferrable fron1 various circumstances;; Thus it has 
been declared that the husband's authority to act 
as the wifes agent is not to be implied from the 
1narital relation, the mere fact that he occupied 
or managed or controlled, his "rife's real estate, 
the offer of suggestions by the wife concerning 
the building or improvements, or the exhibition 
of interest hy the \vife in the \Vork. 
"It is generally held that the tnere kno,vledge 
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10 
of a n1arried woman that a husband is making 
improvements upon her property is insufficient 
to establish the fact that he is acting as her agent. 
.Nor does her failure to dissent from the proposed 
transactions import an intention to bind her prop-
erty. 
''A number of circumstances have been held 
to disprove the agency of the husband, as for ex-
ample, the fact that the claimant did not know 
that the materials in question were to be used on 
the wifes property. That the claimant did not 
know that the wife did not know that the wife 
owned the land on which the improvements were 
made, that the wife had no knowledge that the 
huspand purchased the materials on credit, took 
no part in the planning or construction of the 
building, suggested no alterations during pro-
gress of the 'vork, contributed no money toward 
the improvement, gave no directions as to the 
work, or took no part in the purchase of the ma-
trrials used; and that the husband signed the 
con tract and treated the house as his own. 
''Other circumstances which have been held 
not suffieien t to prove the hus fiands agency are 
the facts that the 'vife owned the real estate on 
\Yhich the improvements were made. That the 
house on \vhich the improvements 'vere served as 
a family residence, that the wife said that her 
husband wanted the \vork and that she said that 
she would see them paid, as well as that if her 
husband were suited all \vould be suited. Of 
course, where the credit is given to the husand 
alone, no mechanic's lien can attach to the \Yifr':-; 
property.'' 
Every single circumstance set forth in this section 
in which the courts have held to be cirr.tunstanre's fron1 
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11· 
\vhich agency is not inferred ""aB eBtnblished by ·the evi-
dence in this ree-ord. That the clain1ant did not kno\v 
that ~Irs. Can1pbell owned the property was established 
by the testhnony of :\1 r. Lathner. That ~Irs. Can1pbell had 
kno\Yledge that ~Jr. Can1pbell had purchased the Ina-
terials on credit is not sho,vn b~,. the evidence. The evi-
dence sho""S that :Jirs. Campbell kne"" that alterations 
""ere being n1ade but it does not sho\v that she kne'v from 
'vhon1 they ""ere being obtained or \vhether they \Vere 
purchased on credit or not. That :Jlrs·. Campbell to.ok no 
part in the planning or construction of the building, sug-
gested no alterations during the progress of the work, 
contributed no n1oney to,vard the improve1nent; gave r .. o 
directions as to the 'vork or took_ no part in the purchase 
of the materials used is all sho,vn 'vithout dispute in the 
eYidence. 
When the circumstances \vhich the courts have gen-
erally held to be guides in determining whether an 
agency. exists between a husband and wife are applied 
to the facts as they appear in this rec.ord not a single 
circumstance is sho,vn except the cire-umstance that Mrs. 
Ca1npbell permitted ~Ir. Campbell to manage her prop-
erty and this has been held by the great weight of auth-
ority to be insufficient to establish such an agency so 
as to create a mechanic's lien upon the wife's property. 
There is no dispute that the arrangements were all 
1nade by l\lr. Ca1npbell \Vith ~fr. liatimer and l\Irs. Calnp-
hell \Vas never present at any time and that ~ir. Lathner 
sold the goods and perfo~med the labor for l\fr. Camp-
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12 
bell on his personal credit. These circumstances have 
always been considered by the courts to be strong cir-
cumstances indicating that no agency existed. In fact, 
the circumstar1ce that the labor and materials were fur-
nished on ~the personal credit of the husband has been 
held by some courts to be sufficient in and of itself to 
preclude an agency of the husband so as to create a 
mechanic's lien on the wife's property. In the case of 
Kansas City Planing :Jfill Co. vs. Brundage, 25 Mo. 
Appeals 268, the court said: 
''It was his personal undertaking and shows 
that the contractor looked to him for his pay. It 
is the accepted rule of law that an action to en-
force a mechanic's lien can only be brought 
against the debtor." 
In this same case the court also said: 
"That the existence of the express contract 
\Vith the husband renders it impossible to charge 
the wife with an obligation to pay for the im-
provements. Likewise an express contract with 
the husband, where he relies entirely upon his 
credit and extended him personal credit this p·re-
cludes the idea of an agency.'' 
This principle was early recognized in the early 
case of Hoffman v. McFadden, 56 Ark. 217, 19 S.W. 753, 
a case very similar in its facts to the case now before 
the court, where the court said: 
''The contract for the work was made with 
the husband and the labor of the carpenters was 
all paid for by him. All of the materials purchased 
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13 
fro1n the plaintiff and others were procured on 
the husbands order and for aught that appears 
they "~ere sold entirely upon his personal credit. 
The defendant testified that she objected to the 
erection of the improvements for reasons which 
she states. She also states that her husband was· 
not authorized as her agent and that she was not 
consulted about the contract for the improve-
ments and had no kno,vledge of its terms. It is 
our opinion that upon the proof aduced the plain-
tiff 'vas not entitled to relief." 
See also the recent case of Caldwell vs. Overail, 
Okla., 1940, 99 Pac. 2nd 496. 
This court has followed the rule that \Vhere the 
credit is extended to the husband and the claimant relies 
entirely upon the personal credit of the husband, no 
lien attaches to the 'vife's property. In the case of 
J[orrison vs. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 235, this court 
said: 
"~I any authorities are cited by the respond-
ents upon this question but an examination of 
then1 sho,vs that in nearly every case the question 
decided turned either upon a statute authorizing 
the husband to make the contract or upon the 
husband's agency or upon the wife's consent or 
ratification of the contract. In this case the facts 
found are not broad enough to implicate the 'vife 
RO as to bring her \vi thin the rule as con tended 
for by the respondents. In Wadsworth v. Hodge; 
88 Ala. 500, 7 Southern 194, it is held that 'the 
contract must be originally that of the wife by 
herf-'elf or hy her dui~~ authorized agent, or else 
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14 
the husband or other agent must assume to con-
tract for her and in her own behalf and such con-
tract subsequently ratified by her with full knowl-
edge of a con tract of this character no lien will 
attach to her property and where the credit is 
given to the husband he alone is bound.' Although 
it may appear that the wife knew· that the building 
or improvements were in process of erection on 
her land and said nothing or that she and other 
members of the family afterward occupied the 
property as a dwelling. This view is not only 
consonant with reason and justice but is also 
every\vhere supported by the authorities.'' 
The lien was denied by the court in the Morrison 
case upon the grounds that the credit had been extended 
to the husband on his personal credit. That this was the 
grounds for the decision· of the court is clearly shown 
by the cases ",.hich this court cited in support of its 
decision. ·This court_ cited the case of Went vs. Martin, 
89 Ill. 139 and in this case the court said : 
''The contract in this case had no reference 
to the land to which the petitioners· now seek to 
subject to a lien and on the authority of Burk-
hart vs. Reesig, 24 Ill. 529, the land cannot be 
liable for the indebtedness. It is the contract of 
the parties and the furnishing., of the labor and 
materials that creates the lien under the statute 
and the lien cannot be· created or inforced unless 
the contract .. falls 'vithin the provisions of the 
statute. The owner of, the premises made no con-
tract for lumber~ It was not sold upon her credit, 
but on the contrary. it is apparent that the sale 
.. was made .. to Frederick Went upon an open ac-
-count.'' 
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15 
In the en~(~ of ,,,.. ads\Yorth YB. Hodge, cited by the 
court in the 1lorrison rnse, the court said: 
'~'''""here the credit is given solely to the hus-
band he alone i~ bound.'' 
The plain \Yording of the decision in the ::\I orrison 
ease "~hen construed in the light of the cases cited by 
the court in support of its decision clearly shows the 
court's intention of follo,ving the generally accep~ted rule 
of lR\V that ""here the credit is extended to the husband 
on his personal credit no lien attaches to the wife's prop-
erty. See also 36 A.J. )!echanic Liens, Section 101 and 
Hollings,vorth v. Young Hard,vare Co., 198 S.W. 716, 
-! A.L.R. 1018; Cald,Yell vs. Overall, 99 Pac. (2nd) 49G .. 
The testmony in this recor-d ""ithout dispute estab-
lishes the fact that ~I r. Latimer sold the materials and 
performed the labor for :llir. David J. Campbell and re-
lied solely upon his personal eredi t. 
Counsel for the appellant has cited the case of Cald-
\\"ell vs. Overall, 99 Pac. (2496) as establishing an agency 
under facts as they appear in this record but a careful 
exa1nina tion of this case clearly distinguishes it from 
a case with facts as they appear in this record. In the 
Caldwell vs. Overall case the court simply decided that 
the record of the trial court was sufficient to create a 
lien upon the wife's property 'vithout stating any of the 
faets so that we do not kno'v how the court arrived at 
its conclusion that the husband 'vas acting as the agent 
of the \vife. The follo,ving language of the court, ho,v-
PYrr, indicates that the court found that an agency ex-
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iHted because of either an estoppel or a ratification of 
the· contract by the wife after the contract had been 
made. 
~'Without going into detail it is sufficient to 
say that the facts and circumstances as well as 
the admissions of the defendant lead to the con-
clusion that the work was done for her and that 
she knew that. the plaintiff had been employed for 
such purposes by the husband and accepted his 
services with such knowledge.'' 
It is evident from this language that the court up-
held the lien upon the theory that the wife had con-
sented to the work and received the benefits of the con-
tract and was therefore held to be the agent of her hus-
band because she had ratified his contract. This cle.arly 
distinguishes the case from the case now before the 
court. In the case !low before the court the .plaintiff 
did not allege that- l\1rs. Campbell had ratified a con-
tract which was made by Ivfr. Campbell nor did the plain-
tiff allege an estoppel. The plaintiff framed the issues 
of the case purely on the theory that.Mr. Campbell made 
the contract with the plaintiff for the materials -and 
labor with Mr. Campbell as the agent of Mrs. Campbell 
and the plaintiff must stand or fall upon these allega-
tions of his complaint and cannot rely upon a ratification 
by Mrs. Campbell·of a contract made with Mr. Campbell 
and subseq11;ently ratified by her silence and receiving 
the benefits of the con tract and any evidence in this rec-
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ord tending to sho\Y that :\f rs. Can1pbell was ~ilent and 
received the benefits of the contract thereby ratifying 
her husband's contract is entirely i1nmaterial and should 
be disregarded by this court and has no probative value 
in deter1nining \Yhether at the time the \Vork was ordered 
"Jir. Campbell \Yas acting as the duly authorized agent 
of jf rs. Campbell. 
In the case of Cald\Yell vs. Overall cited and relied 
upon by counsel for appellant 'vhile holding that ·the 
"~ife had ratified the contract of her husband by her 
silence and her acceptance of the benefits of the improve-
nlents and sustained the lien on the theory that she had 
ratified her husband's contract then used the following 
language: 
"It is settled that before a lien can be estab-
lished against real estate, the contract must be 
made \vith the owner or the duly authorized a.gent, 
and that the right to the lien depends upon such 
contract. Deka Development Co. vs. Fox, 170 
Old. 228, 39 Pac. (2nd) 143. While the husbands 
authority to act for the \vife is not implied fron1 
the marital relation, nor from the 1nere fact that 
he occupied or managed and eontrolled his wife's 
propert~~, yet in many instances the agency of the 
husband is inferred from the circu1nstances, as 
\Vhen the "~ife knew that the lien claimant was 
working on the building and personally gave him 
instructions as to parts of the vvork, vvhen she 
participated in conversations bet\veen the con-
tractors and her husband relative to the \Vork 
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\vhilc it was being done, or when she furnished 
what Inoney was paid on some material and the 
building of the house.'' 
This statement of law by the court was taken by 
the court from 18 R.C.L. 901 and 40 C.J., page 99, sec-
tion 87, and represents the great weight of authority. 
Applying the facts as they appear in this record to the 
law as expressed by the court in the Caldwell case, cited 
by counse.l the trial court did not err in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. There is not a single cir-
cumstance in this record indicating an agency within 
the language of the .court in the Caldwell case except 
that Mrs. Campbell permitted her husband to manage 
her property ·and this was by the court expressly declared 
to be insufficient. ~irs. Campbell was not present 'vhen 
the contract was made; she gave no directions as to the 
work; she participated in no conversations between her 
husband and the plaintiff and she furnished no money. 
Counsel has attempted to distinguish this case from 
the case of ~1orrison vs. Clark but there is very little 
difference. The fact that Mr. Clark contracted in writ-
ing seems to make little difference, for in both cases the 
contract was with the husband alone and on his own 
behalf and the credit was extended to the husband in 
both cases and the court .. denied the lien in the Morrison 
case upon the ground that the credit was extended to 
the husband alone .. · Counsel seeks to further distinguish 
the case from the Morrison case and on the bottom of 
page 14 of his brief counsel says that in the Clark case 
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~[rs. Clark believed that her hu~band "Tas and he "Ta~ 
in fact financially able to pay for the labor and materials 
furnished "Thile in this case ~Irs. Carnpbell knew that 
her husband "Ta~ financially en1barrassed and unable to 
pay for the \York and n1aterials. This statement of coun-
~e l is not sustained by the record. 
Q. \Y.hen did you discover :\frs. Can1pbell that 
you did 0\Vn the property u? ~ 
.. :\.. :\f r. Ca1npbell \Van ted to borrow some n1oney 
on it to do some improvements and he 'van ted 
me to sign a note so he could fix it up and 
he told n1e it \Vas in n1y name. (Transcript, 
page 5.) 
~frs. Campbell \vas apparently confused when she 
so testified because on page 9 of the transcript she states 
the true facts that the n1oney there referred to 'vhich 
she talked about borrowing was the money which she 
horro\ved from Trac~T Collins Trust Co., for the purpose 
of paying for the property. 
Q. At the time of the execution of this deed fron1 
S. D. Rideout to you you had to mortgage 
the property 'vith Tracy Loan & Trust Co. 
did you not to pay off the previous notes~ 
.A.. Yes. 
This is the onl~T evidence in the record that Mrs. 
( 
1
an1pbell ever furnished any money or paid any bills, 
and this was for the purchase of the property .. But the 
evidence is that 1Ir. Campbell had just completed two 
jobs for I\fr. Campbell and that he had been paid in full 
for both of these jobs writh the exception of a fe\V dollars 
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by ~1r. Campbell. So that the evidence does not show 
that 11r. Campbell was unable to pay for the work and 
that ~frs. Campbell knew it. 
The purport of a number of. cases is that the land 
of a married woman upon which a party erects a build-
ing in pursuance of a contract made with her husband 
cannot be subjected to a lien where her title is of record 
in the absence of positive fraud (50 A.L.R. 9'60). In this 
same connection see Alexander vs. Andelusia Mfg. Co., 
supra, 195 Ala. 477, 70 S. 140, where the court used the 
following "language: 
''The wife not only knew of the repairs which 
her husband was having done on ·her property 
and said nothing but was constantly present while: 
the repairs were being made and gave directions 
as to how it was to be done. In deciding the case 
the court while not commending the conduct of 
the wife and husband said: 'Yet the long estab-
lished rules should not be wrenched from their 
effects or denied efficacy to avert what proper 
caution and precaution on the part of the ma-
terialman would have made impossible in this in-
stance. The materialman should have ascertained 
beforehand that the proposed improvements were 
to be on the property not owned by the husband. 
To their lack of care for their own interest is to 
be attributed the opportunity this husband and 
wife have been afforded of receiving the benefits 
at the expense in part of the materialman'." 
The reasoning of the court in this case is sound in 
principle. Where the title to the property owned by the 
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\rife i~ on record and thPrt• i ~ no fraud or eonet>alntPn t. 
there should rest upon a n1ateriahuan \Yho deals with 
the husband the duty to use at least ordinary care to 
detern1ine before the Inaterials are furnished "\Vhether 
the husband is acting as h~r agent or not. nfr. Latimer 
did not use co1nn1on ordinary care to deterinine whether 
~[r. Can1pbell \vas acting as·the duly authorized agent of 
~frs. Can1pbell or not. At the time these materials and 
labor \\~ere furnished :Jfrs. Ca1npbell \\'"as the record 'o,vn-
er of the property and this :\Ir. Latimer kne\v or shol1ld 
haYe kno\vn. :Jfr. Latiiner also kne\v that in order to have 
a lien upon the property of ~Irs. Campbell the contract 
1nu~t be \Yith her or her duly authorized agent. At the 
time ~Ir. Latimer entered . into the contract \Vith nir. 
Can1pbell for the 'vork and materials he should have de-
terinined 'vhether he 'vas acting a.s the duly ~uthorized 
agent of :Jirs. Campbell and this could have been done 
hy sin1ply asking ~f rs. Campbell whether she had au-
thorized Jf r. Ca1npbell to n1ake the imp'rovements. At 
the tilne the c"ontract \Yas entered into with nf r. Campbell 
for the improvement~ this question of whether :\f r. Camp-
hell ",.a~ acting as the duly authorized agent of l\[rs. 
Ca1nphe1l coula of been so easily deter1nined by ~f r. 
Latilner \Vith the exercise of ordinary care that it no"\v 
:-;rein~ a travesty on. justice for this- plaintiff to no\v 
ask this court to hold that 1f rs. Campbell was the un-
di~elosed principal and ~r r. Ca1npbell \Vas acting as her 
agent upon ~uch evidence as appears in· this record. 
RnrPl~· un(ler ~ueh eircu1nstances fhe court should require 
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very p~sitive and definite evidence to establish such an 
agency and such an agency should not be established 
from the conduct of the \vife unless such conduct amounts 
to positive fraud or vvras such as to mislead the plainti.ff 
into believing that at the time the contract \Vas entered 
into and the materials furnished he was authorized to 
act as her agent. See Swenton vs. Hale, 280 Pac. 437. 
There is no such evidence in this record. 
The record in this case shows that 1\1rs. Campbell 
\Vas entirelv· under the don1ination of her -husband and 
"' ' 
that she signed the contract for the sale of the property 
just to keep peace in the family. 
In the case of Coorcen vs. Zieke, 79 S. 562 at page 
563, the court said : 
,. 'So far as we are advised, she may have 
supposed that the \Vork was being done upon the 
personal credit of the husband for that reason 
no elen1ent of estoppel can intervene; not having 
been consulted as fo the improve1nents and being 
under such arbitrary dorninion as the evidence 
sho\vs she \vas she· was not bound to have a row 
\vith her husband and order the workmen from the 
premises at the risk of having her property incuin-
bered by a lien. Being a married \voman she was 
not free to act entirely ·as she pleased noh,Tith-
standing the liberality of modern legislation, 
married women are somewhat under the dominion 
and control of their husbands and such relation 
n1ust be considered when it is sought to bind her 
property.'' 
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This (lase does not prPsent n situation "~here 1\f rs. 
Ca1npbell through a course of dealing had led ~lr. I..Jati-
tner to believe that ~lr. Ca1npbell '"'as authorized to act 
a~ her agent but in this respect the evidence of Mrs. 
Ca1npbell is a little misleading and apparently· 1\lrs. 
Can1pbell " .. as confused. ·On page 13 of the transcript 
~f r~. Can1pbell testified: 
Q. .A .. nd you also had in this same neighborhood 
t\vo other pieces of property at the same 
time, did you not~ 
_A_. Xo, sir, :Jfr. Campbell had them and put them 
In n1y name. 
The fact is that these pieces of property were not 
i the name of ~Irs. Can1pbell as shown by the testimony 
of :Jir. Latimer at bottom of page 22 of the transcript. 
Q. 'Y"ith the value of the property in mind. Mr. 
Ca1npbell owned the property on 4th North, 
didn't he1 
A. I don't know. 
Q. \Y. ell, let me refresh your memory, then. This 
is a lien you filed on the property. You 
recite in there that l\1r. Campbell \vas the 
legal owner of the property. 
A. That is right. 
Q. ~r r. Campbell was the legal o\vner of the 
property, wasn't he~ 
·A. Yes, sir, on that. 
So that this is not a. case where ~Irs. Campbell 
O\vned a number of pieces of property and through a 
rourse of dealings bet,veen her husband and Mr. Latimer 
had led ~~ r. I..Jatimrr to believe that ~fr. C-ampbell 'va~ 
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her agent. There was nothing in the previous conduct 
of 1frs. Campbell in the previous dealings of Mr. Camp-
bell and Mr. Latimer that would justify Mr. Latimer in 
assu1ning that Mrs. Campbell was authorized as her 
agent. 
Counsel ·on page 15 of his brief argues that !{r. 
Campbell had no estate from which plaintiff might re-
cover. That Mrs. Campbell's property had received the 
benefit of the labor and materials. It is true that the 
property re~eiv.ed the benefit of the labor and material. 
But the evidence was that ~rs. Campbell was compelled 
to ~eed the property back to 11:r. R~deout by warranty 
deed because she was unable to make the payments. 
·Mrs. Campbell in fact received no benefit from the 
work and materials furnished by; the plaintiff and if this 
court should sustain the lien upon the property and 
enter a judgment against the defendant the result would 
be a judgment which Mrs. Campbell would personally 
have to pay. This is a situation the courts have alwayR 
endeavored to avoid. To sustain a lien under the facts 
as they appear in this record would re:p.der unsafe the 
separate estate of any married woman who is under 
the domin.ation of her husband as was 1{rs. Campbell. 
Surely in such a case where ~the wife has put the ti\tl~ 
to her property on record and !{r. Latimer knew or 
should have known that she was the owner, Mr. Latimer 
cannot completely 'close his eyes and disregard this fact 
and deal with her husband as the owner without even 
consulting her and then aft~r ·the death of .Mr. Camphell 
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atten1pt tn reroYrr fron1 ~lr~. CniHpbell on the thPor~r 
that he \\·a~ arting n~ hPr agPnt unle~~ he can sho\\· that 
:\f r~. Can1phell by her act~ and eon duct prior to thP 
tilne the plaintiff t•xtended the credit \YPre ~nch a~ to 
lead hin1 to belirYP that ~r r. ("'ian1phell "·as in fact arting 
a~ her agent in ordering the \\·ork and \\·hpre her title is 
of record nothing ~hort of po~itiYe fraud should he suffi-
cient to e~tabli~h ~uch an ag·ency and in1posp upon lVf r~. 
Ca1npbell the obligation of personally a~~un1ing a lo~~ 
w·hich 'vith the exercise of conunon ordinar~· prudence 
and bu~ines~ practices the plaintiff n1ight have avoided 
hy consulting ~r rs. Can1pbell before he dealt \Yith her 
hu~hand. 
COXCLUSION 
In conclu~ion I submit that the great preponderance 
of the evidence in this record when considered in the 
light of the authorities 'vherein the ·courts have refused 
to ~n~tain a lien upon the \vife 's property, is sufficient to 
~u~tain the Findings of the trial court that the plaintiff 
did not ~ell the n1aterial~ and furnish the labor to ~f rr. 
Ca1nphell a~ the duly authorized agent of the defendant 
~r r~. Susan Campbell and the couTt committed no error 
in l'efu~ing to render a judgrnent for the plaintiff and 
rendering a judgment in favor of the defendant, no cause 
for aetion. 
Respectfully svbmitted, 
DFJ.AN E. Fiu\NDERS, 
.A ttornf.lJ fo.r Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
